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Abstract
The relevance of public support for monetary policy has largely been over-
looked in the empirical central bank literature. We have constructed a new
indicator for the support of the German Bundesbank and present descrip-
tive and empirical evidence. We find that major German interest groups
were quite heterogeneous in judging a given policy stance. Empirically,
we show that (a) public support can (at least partly) offset pressure from
other organized groups and (b) accounting for popular support of the cen-
tral bank allows to make more accurate forecasts of the short-term interest
rate.
Keywords: Bundesbank, Public Choice, Support
JEL classification: E58, E52
1 Introduction
After a long debate the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has
finally started on January 1st, 1999. The slide of the euro exchange rate against
the US dollar has again sparked the fears of Eurocritics: A weak currency, which
translates into high inflation. So, to become a success in the long run, inflation in
the Eurozone must remain low. The prerequisites for that to happen are unclear.
Empirical evidence points to the possibility that a high degree of central bank
independence lowers inflation.1 Probably more important than institutional
arrangements, however, is the public attitude with regard to monetary policy:
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1See Berger et al. (2001) for an overview.
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the Germans, for example, are often considered to be especially inflation averse
due to the traumatic experience of two hyperinflations.
Different societies tolerate different levels of inflation, but we do not know
which factors determine a society’s ‘preferred’ level of inflation. Posen (1995) has
emphasized the importance of the financial sector and its opposition to inflation,
but this is probably not the only factor.2 The German central bank has never
hesitated to stress the differences in ‘stability culture’, i.e. relative inflation
aversion, among EMU members, but these differences are hard to quantify. As
van Lelyveld (1999) shows, even within countries it is not entirely clear who
wants stable money!3
Before the EMU started inflation has declined in all member countries, which
indicates that stability culture can be built up; yet, it remains unclear how
stability culture develops. Certainly a key aspect in that respect is a central
bank’s ability to maintain tight monetary policy during ‘rough times’, that is,
when the central bank is under pressure from politicians or pressure groups to
change the policy stance. This ability hinges at least partially on the degree
of popular support, as support for the central bank makes it easier to resist to
threats from organized groups.
In studying pressure on central banks the German case is quite interesting.
Before the European Central Bank was established, the Deutsche Bundesbank
was considered as the most independent central bank in the world. Moreover,
it was the dominant European central bank before EMU started and has been
the design model for the ECB. The questions we want to tackle is the following:
what happened, when the Bundesbank was under pressure – did anyone support
current monetary policies? And if so, did it have any impact of the Bundesbank’s
policies? How likely is it that similar support exists for the ECB?
These questions can not be answered within the traditional macroeconomic
framework. We try to give an answer to these questions by estimating a model
for Bundesbank policies, which incorporates not only economic, but also political
factors. We outline our methodological approach in the next section, before
we estimate a purely economic model (section 3). In section 4 the model is
transformed into a public choice model by adding data on political pressure, in
section 5 we extend the model by including public support. In the final section
we will sketch some implications for the ECB.
2See also de Haan and van’t Hag (1995) for a critical review of Posen’s empirical results.




2.1 Factors that determine monetary policy
The classical literature on central banking assumes that monetary policy is
determined by economic variables, e.g. if inflation is high, then the central bank
will respond by raising interest rates. While the economic situation undoubtedly
has a big impact on the policy stance, the public choice literature has pointed
out that other factors should also be considered. We often observe in real life
that certain parts of the population try to apply pressure on a central bank, e.g.
before elections.4 While pressure on central banks has been the subject of many
empirical studies, the possibility that a central bank enjoys support from the
population has largely been neglected in the empirical central bank literature.5
Yet a central bank can only be strong if it enjoys broad support.
We extend the existing public choice view of monetary policy by adding pub-
lic support as a factor influencing the central banks decisions. Our framework
for monetary policy thus consists of three components: Economics, pressure and
support (see figure 1).6 We will explain each factor in turn.
Economics is a term for the economic situation, characterized by GDP growth,
inflation etc. Each economic situation has an ‘optimal’ monetary policy,
that is, a policy that fits the economic needs of the current situation. Such
a behavior is for instance the basis of the type of policies reflected in the
Taylor-rule.7
Pressure means that some parts of the population demand a change in mone-
tary policy. In our view pressure might result from various parts of society
(politicians, employer’s organizations, trade unions or commercial banks),
but also from public opinion, as expressed e.g. in comments in newspa-
pers. If the pressure is strong enough, it might result in deviations from
the optimal monetary policy, that is, it might force the central bank to
pursue a policy not compatible with the current economic situation.
4A number of reasons have been put forward why pressure may be put on central banks, be
it for electoral or other reasons. See for instance the literature on the political business cycles
(Nordhaus, 1975), partisan politics (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) or conflict models (Frey and
Schneider, 1981. Maier and de Haan (2000) provide a survey of the empirical public choice
literature on the Bundesbank.
5For historical evidence on Bundesbank support see Berger and de Haan (1999).
6We abstract from the possibility that the Bundesbank or the central bankers have op-






















Figure 1: Methodology: The impact of economics, pressure and support
Support strengthens the central bank: if the central bank enjoys a high degree
of confidence or support from the population, it has a better position
in public discussions about monetary policy and pressure groups have
more difficulties in convincing the public, but also the central bank, that
monetary policy should be changed. Thus support might (partly) offset
the pressure of pressure groups. The higher the support, the ‘stronger’ the
central bank and the more it can focus on economic variables. We assume
that any group of the population can offer support to the central bank.
Why would a central bank give in to pressure, especially an independent
central bank such as the Bundesbank? One can think of several reasons: the
fact that governments might force the central bank to take certain actions is
well-known. Here the argument is that even central banks with a high degree of
legal independence might (at least partly) comply to politicians as they fear that
otherwise their legal independence might be threatened.8 Pressure groups do
not have the possibility to change the level of independence, but central banks
might nevertheless listen to their wishes, as they might fear pursuing a certain
monetary policy ‘against the wishes of the population’.9 Overall, a central bank
8Note that the independence of a central bank is always relative as the parliament has the
possibility to change the central bank act and (partially) remove the statutory independence.
For a more extensive discussion see Frey and Schneider (1981). The ECB is an exception to
that, as changes to its legal status require the unanimous consent of all EMU Member States.
See European Central Bank (1999).
9Assume the following: a pressure group demands a certain monetary policy. If it is well-
organized and represents a significant share of the population, the government might listen to
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might fear to lose the support of the public opinion, as only a high degree of
confidence of the society can guarantee independence in the long run. This
makes the Bundesbank not indifferent to pressure, even though it is nominally
independent.
Most components of our model are well-known: if we completely abstract
from pressure and support, we only look at the economic situation. This is an
approach e.g. followed by Clarida and Gertler (1996): they estimate a reaction
function and include only economic variables as independent regressors to ana-
lyze the Bundesbank’s behavior. Adding the pressure component to this basic
model yields the public choice perspective. Finally augmenting the public choice
model by adding a support variable allows to examine supportive actions. As
the literature has developed along these lines, we will start with the simplest
case and then extend the model.
3 Traditional Macroeconomic Model
In the world of traditional macroeconomics a central bank concentrates only on
economic variables, political pressure on a central bank is neglected. Econo-
metrically, this can be expressed as follows: the central bank would like to set
monetary policy such that
iCB,t = Γ (Economic variables) + t, (1)
where monetary policy is measured by iCB,t and the relevant economic variables
are aggregated by a function Γ. As dependent variable we use the day-to-
day rate it; a short-term interest rate which the Bundesbank regards as ‘key
indicator’ for monetary policy.10
When we measure the interest rate it may deviate from the predicted level
by an error t, which is caused by (1) our less-than-perfect knowledge of Γ, (2)
by the fact that even the central bank does not fully control the market rate
their demands. If the government concludes that they need the support of this group for their
policies, they might be inclined to signal to the central bank that a change in the policy stance
would be desirable. If the influence of the pressure group is strong enough, the government
might even signal that otherwise the central bank’s independence might be in danger.
10See Deutsche Bundesbank (1995). Even though officially the Bundesbank used monetary
targeting we have decided to use a short-term interest rate as indicator, as several studies,
e.g. Bernanke and Mihov (1997) have shown that monetary targeting was in practice less
important than the Bundesbanks official statements might suggest. We believe that the short-
term interest rate is the best available proxy for the German monetary policy, as the use and
weight of single policy instruments changed over time. See also von Hagen (1998), p. 453,
and Maier (2000)
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and (3) possibly also by political factors which we have chosen to neglect in this
early setup.
In practice, we encounter a few problems when we try to estimate the func-
tion Γ: some of the economic variables used by the bank are known, like the
unemployment rate and the rate of inflation, but a number of variables such
as ‘the mood on the stock market’ (irrational exuberation, for instance) cannot
so easily be quantified. Making matters worse, the number and kind of these
unknown variables are probably subject to shifts over time. So while the func-
tion Γ is an interesting theoretical construct, there are major obstacles in its
practical use by observers outside the Bank.
However, we do have an indicator that shows what the intentions inside the
Bank led to in the previous period, namely: the interest rate of that period.
This rate is a perfect (up to t) indicator of Γ. So, we can use lagged values of i
as explanatory variables to increase our understanding of the current level of i.
This leads to a new formulation of equation (1):
it = ∆ (L (i)) + Γ (Economic variables) + ′t, (2)
where L (.) is the lag function. Now, prediction errors ′t are caused by three
things: imperfect knowledge of ∆ and Γ, market fluctuations and, thirdly, un-
observed circumstances inside the Bank that led to innovations in i.
To make the model econometrically feasible, we start with the standard as-
sumption that the Bundesbank cares about inflation and, perhaps to a lesser











δlUt−k + t, (3)
where pit denotes the rate of inflation and Ut is the unemployment rate.11 The
number of lags is determined using Akaikes Information Criterion (AIC). Ad-
mittedly, this is a very simple reaction function, but this regression serves to
illustrate the traditional macroeconomic approach – and more sophisticated
specifications basically deliver similar results.12
The results for this model are presented in table 1.13 We see that both the
11We use growth rates, variables have been detrended if necessary to ensure stationarity.
See the appendix for details.
12Recent papers often use VAR model to estimate reaction functions, e.g. see Bernanke and
Mihov (1997) for the German case.
13In all tables ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
6
Variable Lagsa Sumb F-Eachc
Interest Rate 9 0.95∗∗∗ 316.71∗∗∗
Inflation 2 0.10∗∗∗ 9.28∗∗∗
Unemployment 4 −0.22∗∗∗ 5.03∗∗∗
R2 adj. 0.89
AIC 2.58
Table 1: Traditional Macroeconomic Model
aNumber of lags according to the AIC criterion
bSum of the estimated coefficients: neutrality tests
cF-statistic testing whether each of the estimated coefficients equals zero
coefficient of the inflation rate and unemployment are highly significant: higher
inflation leads to higher interest rates, while rising unemployment leads to lower
interest rates. This is the typical behavior we might expect from a central bank.
4 Traditional Public Choice Model
The traditional macroeconomic approach is useful as a starting point, but it is
far from giving a complete picture of how monetary policy is determined. It
might be desirable that monetary policy is only influenced by economic factors,
but this is not very realistic. In practice central banks have often been exposed
to external pressure, be it from the government or be it from other sources.
The public choice literature has sought to examine this component of mon-
etary policy and has shown that external influences cause deviations from the
‘economically-desirable’ policy. Therefore we augment our reaction function:
it = ∆ (L (i)) + Γ (Economic variables) + Φ (Pressure variable) + ′′t . (4)
With this formulation, it is still possible for researchers to predict the Bank’s
preferred interest rate, taking into account the political pressure. We assume
that, like Γ, the function Φ can be known, or can be estimated from the data.
Errors in the prediction, denoted by ′′t this time, are no longer caused by ne-
glected political pressure; they reflect imperfect knowledge of Γ and Φ and by
market fluctuations.
4.1 The ‘Pressure’ variable
The main difference between the macroeconomic approach and the public choice
literature is that the latter allows for ‘pressure’. And in an empirical study, that
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is exactly the problem, as measuring this ‘pressure’ is tricky.
Historically, as a first attempt, it has been assumed that political pressure
occurs in certain intervals, for example before elections.14 Obviously, this is not
a very flexible choice. High pressure might occur following political disputes or
economically difficult situations, regardless of the electoral calender. Next, Frey
and Schneider (1981) have developed a conflict model, where pressure on the
central bank occurs when government and central bank follow different economic
policies.15 The problem here is that (a) the direction of fiscal policy is difficult
to measure (certainly on quarterly or monthly basis), and (b) different policies
need not indicate a conflict, but could also be a desired policy mix.
Historical or anecdotal evidence gives a description of conflicts, but are fairly
subjective. The problem is that from this literature we know fairly well when
conflicts occured, but lacking objectiveness we cannot use it to build an indi-
cator. Yet, a simple pattern such as ‘electoral dummies’ does not realistically
reflect the complicated relationship between government and central bank.
Havrilesky (1993) has found a solution to this problem. He has developed a
relatively simple and objective methodology to build an indicator for pressure.
The basic assumption is that if conflicts between the government and the cen-
tral bank occur, this is ‘interesting news’, which will therefore be reported in
the newspapers: all monetary policy information from exchanges between the
government and the central bank
‘... that is of value to market participants will systematically appear
in the financial press. Specifically, we assume that the policy content
of formal and informal communications from the Administration to
the Federal Reserve ... is reliably and consistently reported in the
press.’16
More severe struggles will lead to more reports, so this evidence can be
used to determine the ‘strength’ or ‘severeness’ of a conflict. Havrilesky built a
conflict indicator using the Wall Street Journal. He counted articles demanding
monetary ease as +1 and articles calling for contractionary monetary policy as
-1. His conflict index then consists of the simple sum of pluses and minuses.
At first this methodology may sound strange, but the empirical results were
convincing: a regression of the Federal Funds rate on this indicator turned
out to be highly significant – and augmenting this indicator by accounting for
14See the literature on political business cycles. Alesina et al. (1997) provide an overview.
15See Berger and Schneider (2000) for an updated version.
16Havrilesky (1993), p.40.
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legislative bills proposed demanding less FED independence during conflicts
only made his results more convincing.17
We have followed Havrilesky’s methodology. Our data set was built in the
same way and has thoroughly been examined in Maier et al. (2001). We will
refer to this data set as the indicator for pressure on the Bundesbank (‘pressure
index’). This data set consists of monthly data and covers the period from
1/1960 to 12/1998.
Havrilesky’s approach was extended in two ways. First, to minimize possible
deficiencies in our data set we have gathered articles from three German news-
papers: The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the Handelsblatt (HB) and
Die Welt.18 Second, we have decided to include all major pressure groups, not
only the government.
An inspection of the newspaper data suggested tracking pressure from the
following sources:19
- the government;
- the financial sector (commercial banks and savings banks);
- employers organizations (export- and domestic-oriented);
- trade unions;
- other: all other articles.
Table 2 summarizes pressure data from the various newspapers. We report the
number of observations, that is the number of articles found in this category, the
sum of all observations, that is the value of all ‘+1’s and ‘-1’s for this category,
and the ‘ratio’, i.e. the percentage of articles demanding tighter monetary policy
over the total number of articles. Unlike Havrilesky we count articles demanding
higher interest rates as +1 and articles calling for monetary ease as -1, thus
facilitating the interpretation of the regression results.
The table confirms some prior expectations regarding the attitude of different
pressure groups with respect to monetary policy: export oriented employers opt
far more often for monetary ease than their domestic oriented counterparts. As
they can profit from lower exchange rates they are more likely to tolerate higher
inflation rates than the domestic oriented employers. Indeed, domestic oriented
employers are the only pressure group with a positive ratio, thus more often
demanding higher interest rates than interest rate cuts. There are a number
of cases where the sum of observations is not equal to the total number of
17Froyen et al. (1997) have shown that this conclusion also holds if additional economic
variables are included in the regression analysis.
18All newspapers tend more to the conservative side, but there are no other suitable German
newspapers that go back until the 1960s.
19Further details of the data set can be found in appendix A.2.
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Pressure on the Bundesbank FAZ HB Welt Total
No. of. obs. ‘Government’ 36 30 19 85
Sum of ‘Government’ -32 -26 -13 -42
Ratio -89% -87% -69% -49%
No. of obs. ‘Financial Sector’ 39 58 43 140
Sum of ‘Financial Sector’ -29 -26 -23 -58
Ratio -74% -45% -43% -41%
No. of obs. ‘Employers org. (export)’ 9 14 9 32
Sum of ‘Employers org. (export)’ -9 -12 -9 -30
Ratio -100% -86% -100% -94%
No. of obs. ‘Employers org. (domestic)’ 7 13 3 23
Sum of ‘Employers org. (domestic)’ -1 3 -1 1
Ratio -14% 23% -33% 4%
No. of obs. ‘Trade Unions’ 16 42 11 69
Sum of ‘Trade Unions’ -16 -42 -11 -69
Ratio -100% -100% -100% -100%
No. of obs. ‘Other’ 25 67 18 110
Sum of ‘Other’ -17 -47 -8 -72
Ratio -68% -70% -44% -65%
Total No. of obs. (‘Total pressure’) 153 254 120 527
Sum of all observations -111 -158 -70 -339
Ratio -73% -62% -58% -64%
Table 2: Pressure on the Bundesbank
observations (for example pressure from the ‘Financial Sector’, as reported in the
FAZ, is -29 whereas the number of observations is 39). This means that several
articles demanding more expansive monetary policy ‘canceled out’ against some
articles demanding a tighter policy stance. This does not occur for trade unions:
they always want monetary ease.
Aggregating over all categories one gets the pressure the Bundesbank faces
from all parts of society (reported in the last line). This is the series we are
most interested in, as it shows the ‘total pressure’ from all parts of society the
Bundesbank faced. Therefore, this is the series we will use.
A plot of this series is found in figure 2. Note the clearly visible spikes in
the mid 1960s, when the issue of revaluation of the Deutschmark was heavily
debated, spikes during the oil crisis (mid 1970s and early 1980s), and around
the German unification (early 1990s). Those were periods when inflation and
unemployment were rising and pressure was high on the Bundesbank.
All major conflicts we know about from historical evidence are reflected in
this pressure indicator, which is a sign that it reliably measures the relationship
between the public and its central bank. So, Havrilesky’s methodology may
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Figure 2: Total pressure on the Bundesbank
and government in absolute terms, yet it is the best possibility we have today
and our pressure indicator correctly displays known conflicts.
4.2 Econometric Evidence
It is relatively easy to incorporate this measure for pressure in our macroeco-
nomic model: the impact of economic variables and pressure on the Bundes-
banks policy is not fundamentally different – a cut in interest rates might be
motivated by decreasing inflationary pressure, but could as well be the result
of serious pressure from, say, the government. Thus we treat pressure like the
economic variables and it enters the Bundesbank’s reaction function in an anal-













ξmPressuret−m + t, (5)
where Pressuret denotes the pressure index discussed above. Similar equations
are found in other empirical articles using the public choice approach: we use
a different type of pressure indicator than most other studies, but the model as
such is not very new.
Our estimates are presented in table 3. They confirm previous results re-
ported in Maier et al. (2001): the pressure index has a significant impact;
additional estimates (not reported) show that the pressure variable is highly
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Variable Lags Sum F-Each
Interest Rate 9 0.96∗∗∗ 298.04∗∗∗
Inflation 2 0.09∗∗∗ 8.11∗∗∗
Unemployment 4 −0.20∗∗∗ 3.81∗∗∗
Pressure 3 0.06∗ 1.93a
R2 adj. 0.89
AIC 2.57
Table 3: Support of the Bundesbank
aSignificant at the 13% level, the coefficient Pressuret−2 is significant at the 1% level.
significant (at the 1% level) with a lag of two months. AIC, the Akaike infor-
mation criterion, drops marginally, which indicates that this model performs
slightly better than the previous one.20 The estimated coefficients for inflation
and unemployment hardly change.
The positive sign on the pressure variable means that pressure to lower
interest rates indeed leads to interest rate cuts. As pressure mostly occured
to lower interest rates (see figure 2) this means that interest rates on average
were lower than the economic variables would have required. These results
indicate that the type of regression we ran in the previous section (standard
macroeconomic regression without policitical variables) can be improved upon
when analyzing the Bundesbank’s behavior. Pressure is a significant variable,
which means that if this variable is omitted in the estimation, the unexplained
variance will be larger.21 Therefore the public choice model gives a better
picture of the factors that influenced the German monetary policy.
To summarize, the above result shows that the Bundesbank did not operate
in a ‘political vacuum’: pressure from organized groups had a significant impact.
Due to public pressure interest rates were lower than they would have been if
pressure had not been applied. So if we want to know what really influenced
the Bundesbanks decisions we have to include political variables.
5 The Role of Public Support
The public choice model has a clear advantage over the traditional macroe-
conomic reaction function. The use of pressure data distinguished the public
choice approach from the purely macroeconomic theory. This is, however, not
20Using the Akaike information criterion as a model selection guide, one selects the model
with the smallest information criterion. See also Kennedy (1998), p. 103.
21Estimation bias is not a big worry in this case, as our estimates show that the coefficients
of the economic variables change little after the inclusion of political variables.
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Support for the Bundesbank FAZ HB Welt Total
No. of obs. ‘Government’ 35 41 12 88
Ratio support/pressure 97% 137% 63% 104%
No. of obs. ‘Financial sector’ 29 64 18 111
Ratio support/pressure 74% 110% 42% 79%
No. of obs. ‘Employers org. (export)’ 12 17 6 35
Ratio support/pressure 133% 121% 67% 109%
No. of obs. ‘Employers org. (domestic)’ 9 12 3 24
Ratio support/pressure 129% 92% 100% 104%
No. of obs. ‘Trade unions’ 3 6 0 9
Ratio support/pressure 19% 14% 0% 13%
No. of obs. ‘Public opinion’ 1 12 1 14
Ratio support/pressure 4% 18% 6% 13%
Total no. of obs. (‘total support’) 104 163 47 314
Ratio total support/total pressure 68% 64% 39% 60%
Table 4: Support for the Bundesbank in different newspapers
the end of the story: reading through the newspapers one does not only find
articles demanding changes in the monetary policy stance, but also supportive
statements can be found. Indeed, they are quite frequent and basically say:
‘Don’t force the central bank to do anything, they know better how to apply
monetary policy. Trust them, they will do the right thing.’ How can such a
supportive behavior be incorporated in our framework?
5.1 The Support Variables
Before we extend the estimates of the traditional public choice approach by
adding support to the model we first we have a look at the support data. Again
we have relied on Havilesky’s methodology: using the same newspapers we now
have focused on supportive statements from the different sources distinguished
above. Articles that expressed support of the current Bundesbank policy, re-
gardless of the actual policy stance, were counted as +1, all other articles were
counted as 0. This data set will be called ‘support index’. As before we have
gathered data for the government and interest groups.
In table 4 we summarize the main components of the support index. For
each pressure group we report the number of supportive articles per newspaper
and the ratio number of supportive articles over the total number of ‘pressure’
articles. As we can see, public support of the Bundesbank is relatively high
across all categories; to some degree, even the trade unions supported the central
bank. Figure 3 plots the most aggregated support index (‘Total support’).
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Figure 3: Total support for the Bundesbank
easily be distinguished.
Apparent is the degree of heterogeneity of the organized groups. Interest
groups define themselves by members sharing a common interest (e.g. exporters
profiting from lower exchange rates). Therefore one would suspect that if such
a group expresses wishes concerning monetary policy, most members would
agree. Yet, clearly the expectation that the ‘best’ policy stance is subject of
debates only between interest groups is wrong, clearly the debate also occurs
within groups. The high degree of heterogeneity can be explained by different
preferences or discount factors of the individual members of an organized group.
To examine the relationship between pressure and support we use absolute
values of the pressure index, denoted as Pressure*. The correlation coefficient
for Pressure* and Support is 0.46, which is relatively low; Granger causality
test reported in table 5 show that correlation runs from Pressure* to Support.22
This means that high pressure from certain parts of the population triggers off
public support.
22We included 12 lags for the Granger test, other specifications confirmed the result.
Granger causality tests F-Stat. Prob.
Pressure* does not Granger cause Support 2.07 0.02
Support does not Granger cause Pressure* 1.11 0.35
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Figure 4: Pressure and Support from the German government
Of particular interest is the relationship between the government and the
central bank. We see that the government more often supported the central
bank than it applied pressure by demanding changes in the monetary policy
stance (i.e. the ratio support/pressure for the government in table 4 is > 100%).
The common assumption that the relationship between these two institutions
is characterized by frequent conflicts apparently does not hold, at least not for
Germany. This is further visualized in figure 4, where we have plotted the
absolute value of the ‘pressure from the government’ variable on the negative
axis, while our ‘support of the government’ index is shown on the positive axis.
Again we see that pressure triggers off support.
To summarize, a first important finding is that interest groups are not homo-
geneous at all. The data reveals a high degree of heterogeneity among interest
groups, that is while some members of a pressure group were demanding pol-
icy changes, others members of the same interest group supported the current
monetary policy.
5.2 Econometric Evidence
So far, we have estimated simple reaction functions. Economic data and data
on pressure easily entered our regressions, as both data have a simple interpre-
tation, e.g. if inflation goes up, interest rates are raised. Our pressure variable
was constructed in such a way that if pressure is positive, we expect a rise in
the interest rate, whereas negative pressure leads to lower interest rates. That
15
means that pressure has a direction, that is we can distinguish between pressure
for higher and for lower interest rates.
The support variable is different. Support can be high in periods with high
interest rates as well as in periods with low interest rates. High support does
not call for higher or lower interest rates, it is ‘unconditional’, which means
that no matter what policy the Bundesbank is following, supporters back its
actions. This makes estimation more tricky: we cannot simply add the support
variable to our public choice equation. Technically speaking, unlike the pressure
variable, support has no direction.
It is at this point that we take an interest in the variance of the error term.
Previously, it was an indicator of how well our model was doing in predicting
the interest rate. However, you can also interpret the error term as a deviation
from the ‘optimal’ monetary policy: if we go back to equation 1, t is high if
economic variables have less power in explaining variation of the interest rate.
This means that other factors besides economic variables used in the regression
might have influenced the central bank’s decisions. One such factor has been
identified in the last section: if political pressure is high, then the central bank
deviates from the purely economic needs.
There are two reasons for this: first, high pressure means that people are
complaining about the Bank’s normal policy. This makes it more likely that
the Bank will deviate from the optimal policy. Secondly, given that the bank
is more likely to deviate, it will be more attractive for speculators to enter the
debt market and try to manipulate rt. Both factors should be expected to play
up when the bank lacks public support.
We need to find a model that mimics this kind of behavior. Our model
should show that the central bank is led more by economic considerations when
its support is high – and is more likely to deviate from the rules when support
is low. In that case, our measure of policy (rt) is not so well explained by the
rule.
We will use a simple linear form to estimate ∆, Φ and Γ and use an ARCH
model to explain the variance in the error term. ARCH, or Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedasticity models, generally have the following form:23
23See e.g. Gourie´roux (1997) and Harvey (1990) for details about ARCH models.
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Variable Lags Sum F-Each
Interest Rate 9 0.98∗∗∗ 346.38∗∗∗
Inflation 2 0.05∗ 11.13∗∗∗
Unemployment 4 −0.12 ∗ ∗ 1.79a
Pressure 3 0.03 1.59b






Table 6: Support of the Bundesbank
aSignificant at the 13% level.
bPressuret−2 remains significant at the 10% level.
yt = x′tβ + εt
εt ∼ N (0, ht)
ht = α0 + α1ε2t−1 (6)
We see that the variance ht of the error term εt varies over time, with a minimum
of α0 and increasing with the previous realization of the error term. We can
amend (6) by allowing for exogenous variables:
ht = α0 + α1ε2t−1 + z
′
tθ (7)
Estimating these equations, now known as an XARCH model, can be done by
maximum likelihood. The value of parameter θ tells us about the effect of the
exogenous variable on expected variance.
Our main estimation results are reported in table 6. We see that (a) the esti-
mated coefficient for pressure is smaller, it becomes statistically less significant
(the Pressuret−2 variable remains significant at the 10% level) and the sum of
the Pressure variable drops; and (b) the Supportt−2 coefficient is highly signif-
icant with a two period lag. The sum of the support variable has the expected
negative sign. Note also that this model yields the lowest Akaike information
criterion, which means that this model outperforms the previous ones and can










Figure 5: Effect of public support on forecast error t
5.3 Interpretation
How should these findings be interpreted? First, we have made the variance of
the error term endogenous. The coefficient for public support is negative, which
means that the variance of t becomes smaller as support for the bank increases,
larger when it is lacking support.
Second, we look at the impact of public pressure: the pressure variable is
less significant compared to earlier estimates and the estimated coefficient is
smaller. This makes sense: we expect the effects of political pressure to surface
when support for the economic rule is low – however, our model tells us that the
variance of the error terms becomes large precisely when that happens. This
makes it harder to detect the effects of the political variable as they are covered
by a larger ‘cloud of error’. Put in simple terms, we have shown that a high
degree of support – at least partly – offsets pressure from interest groups.
We can illustrate the effect of public support on the error term graphically.
In figure 5 we have plotted two hypothetical distributions of the error term,
with the dotted line representing a smaller variance. In the center of these
distributions is our estimate of rt. We know that the variance depends on
the support of the Bundesbank with a negative sign. Translated into figure 5,
the variance of the error term is larger (unbroken line) when support is low,
and smaller when support is high. If we estimate the traditional public choice
model and do not account for public support, the distribution will lie between
the two figures. This means that adding support as an explanatory variable
increases our understanding of the error term. It translates not only into a
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better understanding of the factors influencing the Bundesbank, but also – quite
practically – allows us to make better forecasts.
Summarizing the above, the traditional macroeconomic approach assumes
that the Bundesbank would prefer to focus on economic variables only. Section
4 has shown that this is not the case, pressure from organized groups does plays
an important role. In this section we have demonstrated that our understand-
ing of the factors influencing monetary policy can be improved even more if we
add public support to the traditional public choice model. Pressure is (at least
partly) offset and the estimated reaction function has an error term with an en-
dogenous variance. In periods of high support, this means lower deviations from
the optimal monetary policy, compared to the ‘public choice’-type of reaction
functions. We can make more accurate forecasts of the Bundesbank’s policy if
we account for the public support it enjoys.
6 Implications for the ECB
The literature has identified two main factors influencing monetary policy: Eco-
nomic variables, but also pressure from government or interest groups. We have
investigated a third factor: Public support. We have seen that the Bundesbank
not only has been under severe pressure from all major German pressure groups,
but also that public pressure led to lower interest rates than would have occured
if monetary policy had only been based on economic needs. At the same time
the Bundesbank enjoyed broad support often from the same pressure groups.
This shows that pressure groups are heterogenous. Furthermore, we have seen
that pressure triggers off supportive actions.
Our regression analysis shows that if we account for public support, pressure
from interest groups becomes less important. Also, the variance of the error is
reduced, compared to previous reaction function, which means that we can make
more accurate predictions about the Bundesbanks monetary policy. Neglecting
public support simply does not give a complete picture of the factors influencing
monetary policy.
Our findings also have strong implications for the future of European mon-
etary policy. High support is warranted, as it allows the ECB to concentrate
more on economic needs. Is is likely that the ECB will enjoy a similar degree
of support?
First, there are no indications why European pressure groups should be less
heterogenous as German pressure groups. Therefore we might expect that broad
support is offered if the ECB is under pressure. Second, there is the ‘national
19
factor’: if European monetary policy does not perfectly fit the need of a country
(and it probably will never perfectly fit the needs of all member countries), then
the entire population of this country, which translates into all pressure groups
from one country, could demand a change in the monetary policy. If the current
policy stance fits the needs of other countries better, we can expect support
from these countries.
Clearly, support for the ECB will also depend on (a) people’s believes about
prospects for the economic situation and (b) support for the European Union
in general. Here the latest Eurobarometer survey shows a relatively positive
picture:24 the majority of people take a favorable view of membership of the
European Union, as 50% of citizens consider it to be a good thing (+1% in
comparison with spring 2000), whereas 14% take the opposite view. In each
of the Member States, positive views outnumber negative views, and there was
an increase in positive opinion in four Member States. In reply to the question
about the benefit derived from membership of the Union, 47% of citizens think
that their country has benefited, while 32% take the opposite view. Perhaps
even more important is that 55% of Europeans support the single currency,
whilst 37% are against it.25
To conclude, so far we have no reason to believe that pressure groups will be
less heterogenous in the broader European context than within a single country.
In the EMU support has an additional dimension, that is it will not only consist
of different pressure groups within a country, but will most probably also be
spread between countries. Our conclusion is therefore a positive one: we do not
expect that the ECB will enjoy less support for its policies than national central
banks, instead it is quite likely that pressure from one sector and/or one country
will provoke strong supportive reaction from other sectors and/or countries.
Thus we believe that the support for sound monetary policy at the European
level is not smaller, but higher than at the national level, which allows the ECB
to focus on economic needs more than on pressure from different interest groups.
24The Eurobarometer survey No 54 was conducted in November and December 2000 among
more than 16 000 citizens of the European Union. All results were taken from the website of
Eurobarometer survey 54, http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb/eb54/highlights.html.
25Other European institutions also showed increasing rates of approval: the level of con-
fidence in the Commission, which stood at 40% in spring 1999 and 45% in the previous
Eurobarometer survey, rose to 46% in autumn 2000. The level of confidence in the Commis-
sion exceeds 50% in eight Member States. At the same time, Europeans are optimistic about
the prospects for the employment situation. 30% of citizens consider that it will improve in
2001 (+ 4% in one year).
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Appendix
A.1 The economic data set
The economic data was taken from the CD-ROM of the Deutsche Bundesbank
(1998a). We use the following series: Day-to-day interest rate, consumer price
index and the unemployment rate for West Germany. Growth rates are com-
puted as the change in the log of the raw series and have been detrended if
necessary. All computed series are stationary.
A.2 The data from the newspapers
Both data sets for the Bundesbank’s monetary policy were build during a stay
at the Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA archive) in Hamburg,
Germany. Gathering the data was done by screening all articles related to
the Bundesbank or monetary policy in the newspapers ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung’ (FAZ), ‘Handelsblatt’ (HB) and ‘Die Welt’. For each article the fol-
lowing characteristics were noted: The main actors, the main statements (‘who
wants what’) and the date of appearance. Each article was classified, based on
the following origins:
- Government and opposition in parliament.
- Commercial banks (commercial banks, bank organizations and statements
from the stock market) and savings banks (savings banks and credit co-
operatives).
- Export-oriented trade associations (Bundesverband der Industrie and Bun-
desvereinigung der Arbeitgeber) and domestic-oriented trade organizations
(Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag and the Chambers of Commerce).
- Trade unions,
- Public opinion (journalists, council of economic advisors, economic re-
search institutes, supra-national organizations such as the IMF), con-
sumers (Sparer-Schutzvereinigung) and other opinions or unspecified sources
(such as ‘The Bundesbank is asked to lower the interest rates’ or ‘The de-
mand for monetary ease becomes more frequent’).
For the ‘pressure index’ articles that expressed the demand for more con-
tractionary monetary policy were counted as +1, articles demanding a looser
monetary stance were counted as -1. For the ‘support index’ we counted all ar-
ticles expressing approval of current Bundesbank policy as +1. Both time series
then consist of the simple sum of the pluses and, in the former case, minuses.
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